天主聖三的教義
John D. Zizioulas
天主聖三的教義：卡帕多細亞教父們之貢獻的重要性
原載於Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, pp. 44-60，
為簡明文意本文略作修改。
(英文原文請見本頁底部)
引言
卡帕多細亞（Cappadocia）位於小亞細亞的中心位置，公元四世紀時是基督宗教神學重鎮。早於聖保祿在世的年代卡帕多細亞已是一個小型基督徒團體，基督宗教在該地傳播迅速，二世紀時該處產生了不少殉道者和聖徒，公元325年的尼西亞（Nicaea）大公會議中有七位主教來自此地。不過，直到四世紀下半葉卡帕多細亞才以神學思想著名。這是由於四位領導人物，他們的神學和哲學創思銘刻於基督宗教思想整個歷史中，第一位是聖巴略（St. Basil the Great, ca. 330-79），卡帕多細亞的凱薩利亞（Caesarea）主教；神學家額我略納齊盎（St Gregory of Nazianzus, ca. 330-89/90），他曾短暫地擔任卡帕多細亞的薩西瑪（Sassima）的主教，後來又擔任君士坦丁堡的總主教；聖額我略（St Gregory, ca. 335-94?），他是巴西略的弟弟，曾在尼沙（Nyssa）擔任主教；最後是他們三位的朋友聖盎菲洛基烏斯（St. Amphilochius, 340/45-?），他是依科尼壅（Iconium）的主教。前面三位有不少作品留存在世，包括教義、釋經、苦修的論文著作，演講、講道詞和信件等，這些作品讓我們可以欣賞到他們三位的思想，而聖盎菲洛基烏斯則只留下少數的講道詞和書信，它們中有部分僅為零星的片斷。
雖然這些卡帕多細亞的教父在神學方面的貢獻已獲得普遍的承認和接受，但其實這些貢獻的重要性並不只限於神學。卡帕多細亞教父們的貢獻關係到對古典希臘人文主義徹底的重新定位，包括人的概念和存在的觀點，並證明當時的古老思想對這些的議題不能產生結果，雖然後者在哲學上曾有很多成就。當時的神學爭論造就了這個機會，但卡帕多細亞教父們的貢獻遠超過神學上單純的信理意義，他們影響了後期整個古希臘的文化，甚至可以說，若對卡帕多細亞教父們的貢獻不夠認識，便不能瞭解拜占庭和歐洲的思想。
如果在卡帕多細亞神學的光照下，天主的教義是如何產生的呢？以天主聖三的教義和其哲學體系來看，有那些問題可以透過他們的神學思想得以解決？這神學對人和存在整體的理解有甚麼重要性？這一類的問題都是本文所關注的，然而，這些廣泛和複雜的議題在有限的篇幅中不可能詳盡處理，我們只能提出一些核心思想。雖然對於卡帕多細亞個別思想家已有不少討論，但是對於卡帕多細亞的思想在神學和哲學上完整而深入的研究仍有待進一步的努力。
為了正確地理解和評價卡帕多細亞的思想對於天主聖三的貢獻，我們必須首先找出其歷史脈絡。卡帕多細亞教父們反對甚麼？他們為何採取自己的觀點？他們又如何回應反對者的挑戰？嘗試回答以上這些問題後，我們再行評斷這些教父們的神學對後世連綿久遠的意義。
I. 歷史脈絡
如果我們要突顯在那個年代令卡帕多細亞教父們敏感的議題 — 或可稱為困擾著他們的觀念，我們可以在下面的領域把它們找出來：
A. 薩培里主義（Sabellianism）
薩培里主義是一種天主聖三教義的詮釋，他們認為聖父、聖子和聖神在本體論的意義上不是完整的位格，而是一個天主呈現不同的角色。薩培里似乎以單數使用位格一詞，意味著天主內只有一個位格（Cf. G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, London: SPCK 1936, pp. 113f and 160f.）。這種形式的詮釋使人無法理解聖子如何永恆地，或在道成肉身中與聖父能有相互性的交談，或向祂禱告等等，如同福音中所描述的，並希望我們相信的那樣。同樣地，這種詮釋也使基督徒難以與天主聖三個別三個位格建立完滿的位格性交談和關係，而且造成天主某程度上在創世工程中的工作，似乎只是一種假裝，祂只是看起來是那個樣子，而不是祂向我們自我通傳，把祂真正的自我、存有賜給我們。
因此，天主聖三教義的詮釋必須排除任何薩培里主義或隱藏的薩培里思想，要達到這個目惟一的方法就是強調天主聖三每一個位格的完整性（fullness）和本體論的整體性（ontological integrity）。卡帕多細亞教父強烈地關注這事，他們曾經反對使用「位格」（prosopon or person）來形容天主聖三（參考巴西略Ep., 236:6） — 西方的戴都良（Tertullian）使這詞成為神學上的專有名詞，而可能透過西波呂都斯（Hippolytus）進入東方，因為在古希羅世界中這個詞帶有舞台戲劇或社會角色的延伸意味，卡帕多細亞教父盡力保護聖三的教義遠離那種延伸意義，所以他們時常用三個存有（beings）來談論天主聖三。基於同一理由，他們較傾向使用能夠代表每個位格在本體論上完整性的天主聖三形象，如三個太陽、三個火炬等，因此在尼西亞詞彙中開始有了基本的變革，就是傾向於使用形象（images）來指出由一個來源延伸到三個（如光中之光等）。與此同時，卡帕多細亞教父這種做法難免引起人們以為他們對天主三個位格的關注多於天主的一體性（可參閱著名的教科書主題，可以發現西方以天主的一體性為先，然後才到聖三；而在東方則行相反的路徑）。我們後來會討論到教父們強調三個位格的一體性和完整性，這個思想有著重要的哲學性意涵。
這個對聖三每個位格本體論上的整體性的關注造成了哲學史上的革命，如同在拙作Being As Communion, London: Darton, Longman & Todd 1985, p. 36f. 所稱的，就是位格概念和自立體（hypostasis）概念的密切關係。我們在此無法對這些名詞的歷史作深入討論，但我們必須瞭解到在卡帕多細亞教父前一代的學者是把「自立體」（hypostasis）一詞完全等同於「實體」（ousia or substance）（參閱Athanasius, Letter to the Bishops of Egypt and Libya ，拉丁文substantia字面上的意義可翻譯成希臘文的hypostasis）。聖亞大納修（St Athanasius）曾指hypostasis 與ousia二字無異，二者同是指出存有或存在。卡帕多細亞教父們徹底改變這種觀念，他們把自立體（hypostasis）與實體（ousia）分離，而把自立體連接到位格（prosopon）的概念上。如此一來便使三個位格的表達方式免除薩培里主義的詮釋法，又貼合卡帕多細亞教父們想表達的思想，此舉便成了哲學史上的大變革，後面當我們討論卡帕多細亞教父們思想的貢獻時，我們將有機會再度提出這部分。
對於指出並維護聖三位格的完整性和整體性，卡帕多細亞教父們的確貢獻良多，但對於天主的一體性（oneness）呢？他們的思想有沒有涉及三神論（tritheism）的危險？
為了避免這個危險，卡帕多細亞教父建議天主的「實體」（substance）或「性體」（nature）應採納其普遍類別的意義，應用於談及超過一個位格的情況。他們藉著亞里斯多德哲學來闡釋這個理論，他們指出人的性體或實體是普遍地應用於所有人身上包括具體的人（如若翰、佐治、巴西略），而具體的人本身是被稱為自立體（hypostases），而不是性體或實體（參閱Basil, Ep. 236:6; 38:5 etc.）。如此在亞里斯多德哲學的光照下，卡帕多細亞教父們便去除其立場中明顯不合理的部分，因為談論一個實體和三個位格是乎合邏輯的，正如前面的例子所指。但是這樣有一個神學上的困難，因為上面的例子是普遍的人性而可以有三個（或更多）的人的存有，這時我們必須有三個具體的人，但是在聖三中我們不是指有三個天主，而是一個天主。
為了面對這個神學上的難題，卡帕多細亞教父們分析了在人的存在中調和一體與三位同時出現的困難，我們將會發現這在人學上是意義深遠的。下面先讓我們來看看人類為何不能同時是一體也是三位。
(a) 在人的存在中，性體先於位格。當若翰或佐治或巴西略出生時，人的性體處於他們之先，因此他們所代表的、包含的只是部分的人的性體。透過生育，人性被分享（divided），沒有一個人可以說帶有全部的人性。這就是為何一個人的死亡不會自動地造成其他人的死亡 — 或相反地，一個人的生命也不能造就其他人的生命。
(b) 因此，每一個個體可以被視為一個個別的人（individual），即一個存在性獨立於其他人類的個體。人類的一體性不是在本體論的意涵上相等於他們的多元性。一與多不是並存的，這個存在性的難題使得生命中同時有一和多的說法有邏輯上的困難。
如果我們以此與天主的存在相對照，我們可以立刻發現這個存在性和邏輯上的難題不會出現在天主內。因為天主被定義為沒有原始，空間和時間都無法進入祂的存在，天主聖三的三個位格並不是分享著一個在邏輯上先存的神聖性體，三個位格是與這個神聖性體同時存在。天主內的多不牽涉到祂性體的分開，如同在人身上那樣（參閱Gregory of Nyssa, Quod non sint tres … ）。
因此，不可能說在天主內，如同在人身上那樣，性體先於位格。基於同一理由，我們也不可能說在天主內三個位格中任何一個可以自其他位格中分離而存在或能夠存在。三個位格組成一個堅固的整體，在其中個體主義是絕對無法想象的。聖三的三個位格是一個天主，三個位格的結合是如此堅固的共融（koinonia），以致聖三中任何一位不能與其餘二者分開地理解。一個天主三個位格的奧秘指出一種存有的方式，排除了以個體主義和分離（或自足性和自我存在）作為多元性的判準。在天主內，「一」不單只沒有先存於 — 邏輯上或其他方面 —「多」，相反地為了存在的緣故，從開始「一」即需要「多」。
卡帕多細亞教父的聖三神學是哲學思想上一大創新，它帶來了理解人類存在的嶄新方法。
B. 優諾米烏斯主義（Eunomianism）
優諾米烏斯主義標誌著亞大納修和尼西亞時代所不熟悉的問題，因為它提出了遠比原初的亞略派更為複雜的哲學論點。優諾米烏斯來自卡帕多細亞，並成為Cyzicus 的亞略派主教，屬於最激進，可能也是最深奧的極端亞略派，它稱為「父子不同說派」（Anomoeans）。為了用亞里斯多德學說的辯證法證明聖子與聖父是完全不同的，優諾米烏斯主義者認為天主的實體為非受生的（unbegotten），並推論出基於聖子是受生的（尼西亞自身如此稱述聖子），所以聖子是在天主的存有或實體之外。
若要反駁這個論斷，我們必須指出天主內的實體和位格的明顯區別。作為位格，聖父可以自神聖實體中區別出來，但由此而推論聖子不是天主，或聖子與聖父不屬同一實體卻是錯誤的。當天主被稱為聖父，或非受生的時候，並不涉及其實體，而是指其位格。的確，我們對於天主的實體實在甚麼也不能說，沒有任何特性可以應用，只有一個完全絕對簡單的純粹描述：就是對神聖實體的完全不可知。如果有任何名詞可以用來描述天主的內在特性，它們是用於描述祂的位格性，如非受生的或聖父的父性，受生的或聖子的子性，和聖神的發生。這些自立體的特性都是不可交流的 — 非受生性只屬於其中一位 — 而實體卻是在三個位格中交流的。因此，位格是藉著特性來定義的，那是絕對獨特的，在這個角度來看，位格與性體或實體有著基本的差別。卡帕多細亞教父們反對優諾米烏斯主義的行動一方面澄清了位格和性體之間清楚又基本的區別，使位格的概念能在本體論中清晰地成為獨立類別；另一方面，強調位格性這個概念可以透過其絕對的獨特性和不可替代性而被知悉和被認出，使得位格性擁有哲學上的存在性意義。
自立體特質是不可交流的，這並不是說聖三的位格可以理解為自主的獨立個體，我們必須慎防使不可交流性成為位格定義，如同理查德（Richard of St. Victor）所做的那樣，因為雖然自立體特質不能交流，位格概念是不能在關係以外理解的。卡帕多細亞教父稱位格為名稱，意謂是在關係之中（參閱Gregory Naz., Or. 29 ），聖父是一個名稱，不是指實體，這個名稱代表一種關係，三個位格中沒有一個可以脫離另外兩個被理解，不論是從邏輯或本體論的角度。卡帕多細亞教父把不可交流性（incommunicability）和關係（relationship）兩者調和成一致，也就是把神聖存有由實體對位格的束縛中解放出來，這種束縛只適用於受造的存在。三個位格是非受造的，沒有一個既定的實體擺在前面，三個位格是自由地存在。存有（Being）同時是關係性的和自立性的，由此我們便開始進入卡帕多細亞神學的哲學性意義。
II. 哲學性的意義
在此我們同樣以歷史作為起點，眾所周知希臘教父的思想是屬於柏拉圖學派或亞里斯多德學派的，但其實仔細研究之下，可以發現他們不只沉迷於希臘哲學，同時也被那個時代各種異端困擾。天主聖三的教義提供了一個機會讓卡帕多細亞教父們表達他們對柏拉圖學派的保留態度，不論是明顯的或隱約，而且開始誕生他們的新哲學。
納齊盎的聖額我略在某處談及柏拉圖的地方特別值得在此引述。他說柏拉圖曾論及天主好像一個噴泉流溢著善與愛，聖額我略反對這個圖象，因為它意味著自然或實在的過程，而且是必然的，是存在的發生。額我略不希望聖子的生發或聖神的發出由這樣的詞彙被瞭解，也就是實在的生長方式（在此我們也許會注意到這與亞大納修論天主豐富生命力的本質的概念有些距離）。與其他的卡帕多細亞教父一樣，納齊盎的聖額我略堅稱神聖存在的本源是父，也就是說，是一個位格，如此便使天主聖三進入本體論上自由的問題。在一篇神學論述中，額我略以尼西亞的辯護反對亞略派的指控，亞略派指同一性體在天主的存有中有必然性，額我略依亞大納修的路線，但發展得更深 — 事實上後者對此談得不多 — 他強調父的角色是神聖存有的本原。產生（和發生）都不是必然的，（雖然有一個意志與神聖實體同時存在，如同亞歷山大的濟利祿所說，參閱Cyril Alex., De Trin. 2），而是自由的行動，來自那願意者（參閱Gregory Naz., Or. theol. 3, 5-7），就是父。卡帕多細亞教父申明父為神聖存在的惟一本源，旨在能於本體論上理解自由，這是希臘哲學從未如此出現的。
在這個研究中，我們能夠從一些資料裡發現另外兩個值得欣賞的地方。首先是尼西正-君士坦丁堡信經的細節，這個細節通常沒有得到信理歷史家（如Kelly，參閱J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, London: Longmans 1950, p. 333.）認真的處理，而忽略了它的重要性。381年的君士坦丁堡大公會議明顯地受到卡帕多細亞教父的影響，如納齊盎的聖額我略 — 這位君士坦丁堡總主教全程主導這個會議，這個大公會議勇敢地展開更改尼西亞信經的步伐，就是尼西亞信經中有關子的存有是來自「父的性體」（ek tes ousias tou patros）的說法，這個說法直接改為「來自父」（ek tou patros）。當時大家在運用字詞上有很激烈的爭辯，可以看出卡帕多細亞教父們極力強調父的「位格」是聖三的來源和本原，而非「神聖實體」。
另一點則是關於希臘教父們最後如何理解惟一神格（monarchia）這詞的內容。從本體論而言，也就是以存有的開始來理解，天主內無本原的本源（arche）是與父的位格緊密結合的。惟一神格是指父（參閱Gregory Naz., Or. 42, 15. Cf. G. L. Prestige, op. cit., p. 254），父是三個位格結合的根基（henwsis），其他的位格是出於父，也是朝向父，這個概念不但不會造成位格關係的混亂，反而使各位格連接在一起。正如聖奧斯丁和中世紀士林學派所說的，惟一神格的教義是把天主的一體性建基於父的位格之上，而不是性體之上。這一來父的位格便替代了一個天主，暗示了屬於聖經的一神論，也與聖三神學近似。如果我們希望跟隨卡帕多細亞教父們在一神論的相關性之下對聖三的理解，我們必須採取一種位格性的本體論，也就是從關係而來的團結或開放性，而非由自存的性體而來的，因為自存的性體是獨立的存有。天主聖三概念在哲學上的謬誤，只有由位格取代性體作為本體論中無本原的本原，才是解決之道。
我曾稱卡帕多細亞教父們為哲學史上的革命性思想家，從古希臘思想的速寫中便會明白箇中原因。
在各式各樣的古希臘思想中，從前蘇格拉底哲學家至新柏拉圖學派，無一不希望找到最優秀的思想。在希臘教父時代，有好幾個不同的進路，一些比較神學性，有些則比較哲學性。在卡帕多細亞教父時代，重要的希臘哲學在神學層面是新柏拉圖學派，此學派視神自身為「一」，並把存有的「多」視為流溢說中低一級的物質，透過靈魂的記憶它們最終回歸「一」，那是所有存在之物的最終目的。在第一世紀初葉，斐羅是（Philo）連結古典柏拉圖學派和新柏拉圖學派的重要哲學家，他提出天主是惟一的真神，因為祂真正獨一無二。在卡帕多細亞教父的發展下，天主聖三的教義與這個舉揚「一」凌駕於「多」的哲學思想相遇。
當時古典希臘哲學對人類存在的觀點也是著重性體（nature），而輕忽位格 （persons），卡帕多細亞教父時代的觀點不是屬於柏拉圖學派，就是亞里斯多德學派，前者把人性視為完人的本質（genos hyperkeimenon），是每一個人類的形象，而後者則以人類的物種（genos hypokeimenon）為基礎，著重由此產生不同的人類（See Basil, Ep. 361 and 362，有關這些詞彙和其意義的分析可參考拙作On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood in Chr. Schwöbel，以及 C. E. Gunton , Persons: Human and Divine, Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1991, pp. 37ff）。二者皆指出人類位格的多元性是附屬於本性的必然性 — 或優先性，在古典希臘思想中本性或實體總是優先於位格。
卡帕多細亞教父們以聖三神學挑戰這個既定的哲學思想，他們辯稱性體優先於位格，一優先於多的觀念是源於人的存在是受造的存在，也就是說是一個有開始的存在，所以不可能成為形而上的原則。從哲學的角度而言，真正形而上狀態的真正存有只能在天主身上找到，祂非受造的存在不介入性體優先於位格的情況，即一優先於多的情況。天主存在的方式同時是「一」也是「多」，換言之，在哲學上位格獲得了本體論的首位。
位格獲得本體論的首位意即顛覆了希臘哲學自一開始的基本原則。在古典希臘思想中獨特的位格從未享有本體論的角色，也使得在存有的統一性和整體性中人只是一個部分。柏拉圖談及獨特位格時，清楚地表明整體的存有不是為了位格的緣故，而位格的存有卻是為了整體的緣故。同樣地，古典希臘悲劇邀請人們 — 甚至眾神 — 降服於秩序和公理，二者維繫普世，使宇宙（包括自然界的秩序和人類正當的行為）得以彰顯。在各種不同的存有之下，有一個道（Logos）給予一切存在之意義。任何「多」、任何獨特的存有一旦偏離這個序秩，都會造成存有的混亂，甚至獨特位格自身的混亂。
卡帕多細亞教父們的聖三神學的哲學思想中，「獨特」（particular）絕不是比存有（being）或本性（nature）次等，在絕對的意義上而言「獨特」意謂自由。在古典思想中，自由被珍視為個人的特質，但不含本體論的意義。一個人有自由表達其觀點但最後必須降服於普遍理性，即赫拉頡利圖（Heraclitus）所指的「惟一的道」（unos logos）。而且，在古代哲學中，人能夠以存在為出發點，提出有關其自由的可能性，這完全是難以想像的，事實上，這是在現代由杜斯托也夫斯基和其他存在主義哲學家首先提出的。自由的概念在古代只限於倫理學上的意義，不涉及在世存有的問題，對希臘人來說那是一種既定的外在事實。然而，教父們認為世界的存有是來自一個位格 － 天主 － 的自由。在教父的思想中，自由是存有的本原（更深入的討論可參閱拙作Being as Communion, London: Darton, Longman & Todd 1985, esp. ch. 1）。
卡帕多細亞神學擴展了自由的原則，使之涵蓋天主自身的存有，並強調自由是存有的前提。這是卡帕多細亞教父們的創思，甚至超越基督宗教的先輩，卡帕多細亞教父首次在歷史上把「本原」的概念引入天主的存有中，這樣做是為了使天主的存有不與「一」（天主的性體）結連，而與一個位格「父」結連。透過仔細並持續地區分天主性體和天主父，他們認為天主之所以是天主，本原是因為父的位格，而不是神聖實體。他們給予位格本體論上的優先性，因而使「存在」自實體和自存的邏輯必然性中解放出來。這是哲學上革命性一步，在人學上的影響當然也不能忽略。
III. 人學上的影響
對教父們來說，人是天主的肖像，因為人是受造的，人自然不是天主，也就是說人有一個開始，受時間和空間的限制，包括個別化和死亡，雖然人被召叫以天主存在的方式來存在。
為了理解這一點，我們必須看看卡帕多細亞教父們對性體和位格或他們所說的存在模態（tropos hyparxeos）的區別。性體指出某物存在的事實，指出某物是甚麼（ti），它有可能被想成好幾樣不同的東西。另一方面，位格指出某物是如何（hopos or pos），使人只能料想到某一特定物，這是一個沒有疑問的道理。當我們想到人性，我們想到的是全人類，人性沒有任何獨特的人的意味。人性所有的自然特質，例如分裂 — 個體性因而造成腐敗，繼而死亡 — 都是人性涵括的所有面向，我們可以由此定義何謂人類。其實位格，即人是如何（how）的，才能決定性體的限度是否最終能被克服，這位格是本體論上的本原，如同在天主之存有的例子中那樣。天主在人身上的肖象說明的不是人是「甚麼」，不是關於本性實體 — 人從本性實體上永不能成為天主，天主在人身上的肖象說明的是人這個「如何」， 這個位格性。換言之，人有自由影響自身如何存在，可以依天主的方式（how），或以人本性的方式（what）。依本性來生活會導致個人主義、死亡等等，因為人不是不朽的；若依天主的肖像而生活，意思是說以天主存在的方式而生活，就是天主位格的肖像，就能成為天主。這就是希臘教父們的人學思想。
這樣的思想脈絡是來自於人被天主召叫奮力從所其本性和行為的必然性中釋放自己，如同人由自然律中釋放自己一樣，儘管人的本性如上所述在本體論上優先於位格。從實際的角度而言，這是教父們在苦修的努力中所發現的，他們把這苦修的努力看作人類存在的本質，不論你是一個修士或是活在塵世中，若沒有盡力讓自己自本性的必然性中解放出來，人的位格就不可能成為天主的肖像，因為在天主內，是由於位格而不是由於性體使祂成為祂自己的樣子。
在卡帕多細亞教父的聖三神學中，我們看到其人學本質充滿人類存在的位格性意義。卡帕多細亞教父們留給世界最寶貴的概念：位格人的概念，作為本體論的終極意義。因為這個概念不只是我們基督宗教傳承的一部分，也是我們文化的理想，在卡帕多細亞教父神學的研究中可以提醒我們這個人學確實的內涵和意義。
(a) 從卡帕多細亞教父的位格人概念來看天主的話，位格人不是次等的而是存在中基本絕對的概念。沒有比位格人更為神聖的，因為位格人包括天主自身存在的方式。位格人不能因為任何理想而犧牲或降服，不論是道德或自然法則，或任何便利性或目的性，甚至是極神聖的目的，統統不可以。為了做真實的人，做自己，你必須當一個位格人，那就是必須不受任何必然性或目的 － 自然的、道德的、宗教的、意識形態的 － 而束縛，必須站在比它們更高的位置。位格人絕對的自由才是存在的意義和價值。
(b) 人不能單獨存在，天主也不是孤單的，祂是共融。愛不是一種自然而生的感覺或情緒，像花朵從樹木中綻放那樣。愛是一種關係，它是自由地由人的自我中流露出來，放棄自我的意願，自由地降服於他者的意願。他者，以及他者與我們的關係使我們找出自己是誰，我們的他者性，使我們成為我們自身，也就是成為位格人，因為透過成為關係中不可分割的一部分，在本體論上來說，我們是獨特和不可替代的個體。這說明了我們的存有，我們之所以成為我們自身，不是由於別人，而是由於我們的位格。在這個理由之下，我們之存有的「道」是愛的關係，這愛的關係能使我們為對方而成為獨特和不可替代的。獨一無二的愛「子」說明了天主之存有的「道」，透過這個愛的關係，透過獨生之子的永恆之父，天主成為獨特的和不可替代的，這是教父們的位格概念的重要訊息。人存在的理由 － 這是希臘思想時常在尋找的 －不是在實體內，而是在位格內，是在愛的自由中創造的身分，不是來自其獨立存在的必然性。作為一個位格人，只要你存在，你便會愛人和被愛。若你被當作實體即如同東西一樣被對待，死去時你的獨特身分也死去，就算你的靈魂不朽，那又有甚麼用呢？你的存在只是沒有位格身分的存在，你只會在無名氏的地獄中永恆地死去。因為實體本身不能給你一個絕對特殊和獨特身分的存在和存有。實體時常指向普遍性，位格人則保衛特殊性和絕對的獨特性。因此，靈魂的不朽，就算是意味著存在，也不能代表位格身分真正的意義。因著教父神學對位格的貢獻，現在我們知道天主如何存在，我們知道作為一個獨特的存有真正的存在到底意味著甚麼。作為天主的肖像，我們是位格不是實體，也永遠沒有天主實體的肖像，對一個人來說被吸收進入神聖實體內也不是一件怎麼愉快的事情。只有在這個我們存在的生命中作為一個位格人，我們才有希望在真實的和位格性的意義內獲得永恆的生命。天主是這樣，我們亦然：位格化身分只有在自由的愛和愛的自由中才能產生。
(c) 位格是特殊的和獨一無二的，實體和物種則可以繁衍不絕和被替代。若人被看作是實體和物種則永不是特殊的，而是大同小異的，可以被組成或被解體，他們可以為了製造某種結果或新的物種而結合，他們可以用以達到某種目的，不論神聖與否。相反地，位格人不能如同物種一樣被複製、被繁衍，他們不能被組成或被解體，或因某種目的而進行組合或被利用，就算是最神聖的目的。不論誰若這樣對待人便會使人淪為物件，使他的位格獨特性消失，不再存在，如果我們沒有在這個意義上發現人類同胞是天主的肖像，即發現一個人的位格性，那麼我們也不能發現這個存有真正的永恆的身分。因為死亡使我們全消失在完全一樣的實體中，使我們變成物質。那讓我們成為我們自身的永不磨滅的特質，不是我們的實體而是我們與天主不死的位格身分所建立的位格關係。只有當性體是位格性的，如同在天主內那樣，性體才能真實地、永恆地存在，因為只有那樣性體才會獲得獨特性，並成為我們在天主聖三找到的存有模態：一種獨一無二的、無可取代的特殊性。
結論
如果在我們的文化中，人的存在裡有真正的位格性這樣的思想，我們是得益於四世紀卡帕多細亞教父們的基督宗教思想。卡帕多細亞教父們發展並留下天主的概念給我們，天主的存在是自由的愛的共融，這樣的存在才能產生獨特的、無可替代的、獨一無二的身分，那就是在絕對的本體論意義下的真正位格，如此的天主才是人應該肖似的。與這個真實的、圓滿的位格性人學相比，世上絕沒有更高超、更圓滿的人學了。
整體而言，現代人頗為看重位格性的人學，但現今對位格普遍廣傳的看法卻與卡帕多細亞教父相去甚遠。今天當我們談及位格人時，大部分人會認為位格指個別的人（individual），這需要回到奧古斯丁和五世紀的波哀丟斯（Boethius）的說法，他們把位格定義為個別的實體擁有理性和意識。在整個西方思想史中，有思想、自我意識的個體即為位格的想法使我們的文化認為思想的個體是人學中最高的理念。這不但不是卡帕多細亞教父的思想，反而是相反他們的思想。在卡帕多細亞教父的思想中我們可以看到真正的位格性不是由於分隔的獨立個體而來的，而是由共融，由與他者的愛和關係而來。惟獨由於愛，自由的愛，不受實體必然性的限制，才能產生位格性。在天主內確實如此，祂的存有，如同卡帕多細亞教父所理解的，是出於愛的自由行動，是來自聖父自由的、愛的位格而成的行動，不是來自神聖實體的必然性。對人而言，也是這樣，人被召叫以愛來實踐自由，也自由地實踐愛，如此人自身便能成為天主的肖像。
在我們的時代，有幾位西方哲學家嘗試糾正在西方把位格當作個人的毛病（參閱J. Macmurray, The Self as Agent, London: Faber & Faber 1957, and Persons in Relation, London: Faber & Faber 1961）。基督宗教與其他宗教的會晤，如佛教，迫使人們重新思考對位格性視為個人性這個傳統觀點。今天，也許是一個最合宜的時機讓我們深入地研究來自第四世紀卡帕多細亞教父的基督宗教思想成果，其中最重要的，毫無疑問便是卡帕多細亞教父對位格的觀念。
從更廣的意義來看，卡帕多細亞教父對聖三神學的貢獻有存在主義的意義，它使我們發現一種全人類希望擁有的天主存在的特質，因此也可以說它基本上是一種救恩論。但我想卡帕多細亞教父針對今日關於天主教義的議題還有一些看法值得討論，我特別提出女性神學所提出的問題，尤其有關對天主名號的運用。根據東方否定神學的傳統，卡帕多細亞教父們所有論及天主實體和屬性或力量的語言都必然是不足的。但是，在人的語言層面，必須在實體和位格之間作區分。父、子、神這些名號指出的是位格性的身分，因為這些是惟一指示其位格性身分的名號，所以它們不能被改變。但名號所指示的力量是可以改變的（例如天主是美善的，或大能的），因為它們是自我們的經驗中引用而來的，常常是不足於用以形容天主。那父、子、神又如何？這些名號也是由經驗中挪用的嗎？在天主的父性和人類的父性之間有沒有任何類比的可能性？也許有些與父性緊密相連的品德是可以類比的（如創造者、充滿愛和關懷的人等），但是這些都不是位格性的特點 — 它們可以應用於聖三三個位格中，同樣也可以應用於普遍性的物體或力量。父、子、神是位格身分的名稱，藉著這些名稱天主在基督內通傳自我，告訴我們祂的名稱。聖三語言和天主命名是有很大差別的，從天主性（divinitas）的角度而言，位格身分的名稱不是天主的名字，只是作為位格祂才有的名稱，而且只有在基督內我們才能認識祂這個名稱，只有在基督內祂才如此向我們顯示，也就是說只有在父子關係內，並透過父子關係，祂被稱為「父」。
因此，從理解語言的層面而言，實體和位格的區別是非常重要的；同樣重要的是，我們把一個神等同於「父」還是把祂等同於某種物質，如果祂「父」的身分不是終極位格的身分，只是次等的身分，那麼「父」就不是天主的名字（the name of God），只是某一個關於天主的名字（a name about God），若然是這種情形，它便可以任意被更換，好能更妥善地傳達我們希望傳達的天主的存有。
卡帕多細亞教父們教導了我們，聖三不是學術研究的一回事，而是位格之間的關係。正因如此，只有藉著聖神，參與聖父與聖子的關係，才能讓我們喊出：阿爸，父啊。天主聖三在教會中顯露自身，透過教會這個團體，我們成為耶穌基督的父的眾子女。其他的說法只是絆腳石和謬誤。
John D. Zizioulas
The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity:
The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution
This originally appeared in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, pp. 44-60.
Slightly edited for clarity
Introduction
Cappadocia, which lies in the heart of Asia Minor, became an important centre of Christian theology in the fourth century ad. Already at the time of St Paul there was a small Christian community in Cappadocia where Christianity spread so rapidly as to produce a number of martyrs and confessors in the second century, and to contribute seven bishops to the Council of Nicaea in ad 325. But it was mainly in the second half of the fourth century that Cappadocia became famous for its theological thought. This was due to four leading figures whose theological and philosophical originality sealed the entire history of Christian thought: St Basil the Great, bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia (ca. 330-79); St Gregory of Nazianzus, known as the Theologian
(ca. 330-89/90), at first briefly bishop of Sassima in Cappadocia and later on, also briefly, Archbishop of Constantinople; St Gregory, the younger brother of Basil, bishop of Nyssa (ca. 335-94?); and, finally, their friend St Amphilochius (340/45-?), bishop of Iconium. The first three of these left behind them a considerable number of writings (dogmatic treatises, exegetical works, ascetic writings, orations, sermons, and letters), which allow us to appreciate their thought, while St Amphilochius’ work survives only in a limited number of homilies and letters, some of them only in fragments.
Although the theological contribution of these Cappadocian Fathers is universally recognised and acknowledged, its importance is by no means limited to theology. It involves a radical reorientation of classical Greek humanism, a conception of man and a view of existence, which ancient thought proved unable to produce in spite of its many achievements in philosophy. The occasion for this was offered by the theological controversies of the time, but the implications of the Cappadocian Fathers’ contribution reach beyond theology in the strict doctrinal sense and affect the entire culture of late antiquity to such an extent that the whole of Byzantine and European thought would remain incomprehensible without a knowledge of this contribution.
How does the doctrine of God appear, if placed in the light of Cappadocian theology? What problems concerning the doctrine of the Trinity and its philosophical integrity could be overcome with the help of this theology? What consequences does this theology have for our understanding of the human being and of existence as a whole? These kinds of questions are the essential concerns of this paper. Needless to say, however, such vast and complex questions cannot be dealt with in an exhaustive way in such a limited space. Only some suggestions will be put forth and some central ideas underlined. The Cappadocian contribution still awaits its comprehensive and exhaustive treatment in theological — and philosophical — research, in spite of the considerable number of words devoted to its individual representatives.
In order to understand and appreciate correctly the contribution of the Cappadocians to the doctrine of the Trinity we must first set the historical context. What were the Cappadocians reacting against? Why did they take the view they took, and how did they try to respond to the challenges of their contemporaries? After trying to give an answer to these questions we may consider the lasting significance of these Fathers’ theology for other times.
I. The Historical Context
If we try to single out the sensitivities — we might call them obsessions — of the Cappadocian Fathers vis-à-vis their contemporaries, we may locate them in the following areas:
A. Sabellianism
Sabellianism represented an interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity which involved the view that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit were not full persons in an ontological sense but roles assumed by the one God. Sabellius seems to have used the term person in the singular, implying that there is one person
in God. Cf. G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, London: SPCK 1936, pp. 113f and 160f. This modalistic interpretation made it impossible to understand how the Son, eternally or in the Incarnation had a relation of reciprocal dialogue with the Father, praying to Him, etc., as the Gospel stories require us to believe. It would also make it impossible for the Christian to establish a fully personal dialogue and relationship with each of the three persons of the Trinity. Furthermore, it would appear that God was somehow acting
in the Economy, pretending, as it were, to be what He appeared to be, and not revealing or giving to us His true self, His very being.
For these and other reasons, the doctrine of the Trinity had to be interpreted in such a way as to exclude any Sabellian or crypto-Sabellian understanding, and the only way to achieve this would be by stressing the fullness and ontological integrity of each person of the Trinity. The Cappadocians were so deeply concerned with this that they went as far as rejecting the use of the term prosopon or person to describe the Trinity See Basil, Ep., 236:6. — a term that had entered theological terminology since Tertullian in the West and found its way into the East probably through Hippolytus — particularly since this term was loaded with connotations of acting on the theatrical stage or playing a role in society, when used in the ancient Graeco-Roman world. In their attempt to protect the doctrine from such connotations, the Cappadocians were at times ready to speak of three beings
in referring to the Trinity. For the same reason, they preferred to use images of the Trinity that would imply the ontological fullness of each person, such as three suns
, three torches
, etc., thus introducing a fundamental change in the Nicaean terminology which was inclined towards the use of images indicating one source extended into three (light of light
etc.). By doing this, the Cappadocians came to be known as being interested in the Trinity more than the unity of God. (Cf. the well-known textbook thesis that the West began with the unity of God and then moved to the Trinity, while the East followed the opposite course.) This stress on the integrity and fullness of the persons was full of important philosophical implications, as we shall see later on.
Out of this concern for the ontological integrity of each person in the Trinity came the historic revolution, as I should like to call it, See my Being As Communion, London: Darton, Longman & Todd 1985, p. 36f. in the history of philosophy, namely the identification of the idea of person with that of hypostasis. It would lead us too far to discuss here the history of these terms. Suffice it to recall that only a generation before the Cappadocians the term hypostasis was fully identified with that of ousia or substance See Athanasius, Letter to the Bishops of Egypt and Libya (PG 26, 1036B). (indeed, the Latin term substantia would literally translate into Greek as hypostasis). St Athanasius makes it clear that hypostasis did not differ from ousia, both terms indicating being
or existence
. The Cappadocians changed this by dissociating hypostasis from ousia and attaching it to prosopon. This was done in order to make the expression three persons
free from Sabellian interpretations and thus acceptable to the Cappadocians. That this constitutes an historical revolution in philosophy we shall have an opportunity to point out later, when we discuss the philosophical significance of the Cappadocian contribution.
Now, the Cappadocians seem to have done well with pointing out and defending the fullness and integrity of each person, but what about the unity or oneness of God? Were they not in danger of introducing tritheism?
To avoid this danger, the Cappadocians suggested that ousia (substance) or physis (nature) in God should be taken in the sense of the general category which we apply to more than one person. With the help of Aristotelian philosophy, they illustrated this by a reference to the one human nature or substance which is general and is applied to all human beings, and to the many concrete human beings (e.g. John, George, Basil) who are to be called hypostases(plural), not natures or substances. E.g. Basil, Ep. 236:6; 38:5 etc. In this way, they removed all apparent illogicality from their position, since it is logically possible to speak of one substance and three hypostases (or persons), as the above example shows. But the theological difficulty was there, since in the above example of the one human nature and three (or more) human beings we have to do with three men, whereas in the Trinity we do not imply three Gods, but one.
In order to meet this theological difficulty, the Cappadocian Fathers posed the question of what accounts for the difficulty in reconciling the one and the three in human existence. This was of paramount significance anthropologically, as we shall see later. The reason why human beings cannot be one and many at the same time involves the following observations.
(a) In human existence, nature precedes the person. When John or George or Basil are born, the one human nature precedes them; they, therefore represent and embody only part of the human nature. Through human procreation humanity is divided, and no human person can be said to be the bearer of the totality of human nature. This is why the death of one person does not automatically bring about the death of the rest — or conversely, the life of one such person the life of the rest.
(b) Because of this, each human person can be conceived as an individual, i.e. as an entity independent ontologically from other human beings. The unity between human beings is not ontologically identical with their diversity or multiplicity. The one and the many do not coincide. It is this existential difficulty that leads to the logical difficulty of saying one
and many
with the same breath.
Now, if we contrast this with God’s existence, we see immediately that this existential and hence logical difficulty is not applicable to God. Since God by definition has not had a beginning, and space and time do not enter His existence, the three persons of the Trinity do not share a pre-existing or logically prior to them divine nature, but coincide with it. Multiplicity in God does not involve a division of His nature, as happens with man. E.g. Gregory of Nyssa, Quod non sint tres … (PG 45, 125).
It is impossible, therefore, to say that in God, as it is the case with human beings, nature precedes the person. Equally and for the same reasons it is impossible to say that in God any of the three persons exist or can exist in separation from the other persons. The three constitute such an unbreakable unity that individualism is absolutely inconceivable in their case. The three persons of the Trinity are thus one God, because they are so united in an unbreakable communion (koinonia) that none of them can be conceived apart from the rest. The mystery of the one God in three persons points to a way of being which precludes individualism and separation (or self-sufficiency and self-existence) as a criterion of multiplicity. The one
not only does not precede — logically or otherwise — the many
, but, on the contrary, requires the many
from the very start in order to exist.
This, therefore, seems to be the great innovation in philosophical thought, brought about by the Cappadocian Trinitarian theology, which carries with it a decisively new way of conceiving human existence, as we shall see later.
B. Eunomianism
Eunomianism marked a problematic unknown to Athanasius and Nicaea, since it introduced a far more sophisticated philosophical argument than original Arianism had done. Eunomius, who came himself from Cappadocia, was made by the Arians Bishop of Cyzicus, and was the most radical and perhaps the most sophisticated of the extreme Arians known as Anomoeans. In order to prove by way of Aristotelian dialectic that the Son is totally unlike the Father, the Eunomians placed the substance of God in being unbegotten (agennetos) and concluded that since the Son is begotten
(Nicaea itself called him so), he falls outside the being or substance of God.
The refutation of such an argument requires that we make a sharp distinction between substance and person in God. By being a person, the Father was to be distinguished from divine substance, and thus it would be wrong to conclude that the Son is not God or homoousios with the Father. When God is called Father or unbegotten
, He is called so not with reference to His substance, but to personhood. Indeed, about the substance of God nothing can be said at all: no property or quality is applicable, except that it is one, undivided and absolutely simple and uncompounded, descriptions pointing to total unknowability rather than knowledge of the divine substance. If there are any properties (idiomata) that can be spoken of in God, these are applicable to His personhood, such as unbegottenness or Fatherhood for the Father, begottenness or Sonship of the Son, and ekporeusis (spiration) of the Spirit. These personal or hypostatic properties are incommunicable — unbegottenness being precisely one of them — whereas substance is communicated among the three persons. A person is thus defined through properties which are absolutely unique, and in this respect differs fundamentally from nature or substance. The reaction against Eunomianism produced, therefore, on the one hand a clear and fundamental distinction between person and nature, thus allowing the concept of person to emerge more clearly as a distinct category in ontology, and on the other hand underlined the idea that personhood can be known and identified through its absolute uniqueness and irreplaceability, something that has not ceased to be of existential relevance in philosophy.
Now, this incommunicability of hypostatic properties does not mean that persons in the Trinity are to be understood as autonomous individuals. We must beware of making this incommunicability the definition of person par excellence, as Richard of St. Victor seems to do, for although the hypostatic properties are not communicated, the notion of the person is inconceivable outside a relationship. The Cappadocians called the persons by names indicating schesis (relationship) E.g. Gregory Naz., Or. 29 (PG 36, 96): The Father is a name neither of substance nor of energy, but of schesis
.: none of the three persons can be conceived without reference to the other two, both logically and ontologically. The problem is how to reconcile incommunicability with relationship, but this again is a matter of freeing divine existence from the servitude of personhood to substance, a servitude which applies only to created existence. By being uncreated, the three persons are not faced with a given substance, but exist freely. Being is simultaneously relational and hypostatic. But this leads us to a consideration of the philosophical consequences of Cappadocian theology.
II. The Philosophical Implications
Here again history must give us the starting point. It is normally assumed that the Greek Fathers were Platonic or Aristotelian in their thinking, and yet a careful study of them would reveal that they were as obsessed with Greek philosophy as they were with various heretical ideas of their time. The doctrine of the Trinity offered the occasion to the Cappadocians to express their distance both explicitly and implicitly from Platonism in particular and thus introduce a new philosophy.
One of the references to Plato made by St Gregory of Nazianzus is worthy of particular mention. He refers at one point to the philosopher as having spoken of God as a crater which overflows with goodness and love, and rejects this image as implying a process of natural or substantial and therefore necessary, generation of existence. Gregory would not like to see the generation of the Son or the spiration of the Spirit understood in such terms, i.e. by way of a substantial growth. (Here we may perhaps observe some departure from the Athanasian idea of the fertile substance of God
.) He would insist, together with the rest of the Cappadocians, that the cause or aition of divine existence is the Father, which means a person, for this would make the Trinity a matter of ontological freedom. In fact, in one of his theological orations, Gregory takes up the defence of Nicaea against the Arian accusation that the homoousiousimplies necessity in God’s being and develops it further than Athanasius — who in fact said very little on this matter — by stressing the role of the Father as the cause of divine being. Generation (and spiration) are not necessary but free because, although there is one will concurrent
(as St Cyril of Alexandria would say) Cyril Alex., De Trin. 2. with the divine substance, there is the willing one
(ho thelon) Thus Gregory Naz., Or. theol. 3, 5-7. and that is the Father. By making the Father the only cause of divine existence, the Cappadocians aimed at understanding freedom in ontology, something that Greek philosophy had never done before.
It is in the light of this observation that we can appreciate two more points emerging from the study of the sources. The first is a detail
that we observe in the Creed of Nicaea-Constantinople, a detail dismissed normally by historians of doctrine (e.g. Kelly) Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, London: Longmans 1950, p. 333. as insignificant. I am referring to the fact that the Council of Constantinople of ad 381, operating clearly under Cappadocian influence — Gregory of Nazianzus, then Archbishop of Constantinople was presiding over it for a time — took the bold step of altering the Creed of Nicaea at the point where it referred to the Son as being from the substance of the Father
(ek tes ousias tou patros) and making it simply read from the Father
(ek tou patros). This change at a time when fights took place over words could not be accidental. It is a clear expression of the Cappadocian interest in stressing that it is the person of the Father and not divine substance that is the source and cause of the Trinity.
The other point relates to the content that the term monarchia finally received in the Greek Fathers. The one arche in God came to be understood ontologically, i.e. in terms of origination of being, and was attached to the person of the Father. The one God
is the Father See e.g. Gregory Naz., Or. 42, 15. Cf. G. L. Prestige, op. cit., p. 254: … their (the three Persons’) ground of unity (henwsis) is the Father, out of whom and towards whom are reckoned the subsequent Persons, not as to confuse them but so as to attach them. The doctrine of monarchy had begun by basing the unity of God on the single Person of the Father …
, and not the one substance, as Augustine and medieval Scholasticism would say. This puts the person of the Father in the place of the one God, and suggests a kind of monotheism which is not only Biblical, but also more akin to Trinitarian theology. If, therefore, we wish to follow the Cappadocians in their understanding of the Trinity in relation to monotheism, we must adopt an ontology which is based on personhood, i.e. on a unity or openness emerging from relationships, and not one of substance, i.e. of the self-existent and in the final analysis individualistic being. The philosophical scandal of the Trinity can be resolved or accepted only if substance gives way to personhood as the causing principle or arche in ontology.
I have called the Cappadocians revolutionary thinkers in the history of philosophy. This would emerge from a hasty survey of ancient Greek thought in relation to that of the Cappadocians.
Ancient Greek thought in all its variations, ever since the pre-Socratic philosophers and up to and including Neoplatonism, tended to give priority to the one
over the many
. At the time of the Greek Fathers this had taken several forms, some of them more theological and some more philosophical. On the theological level the predominant pagan Greek philosophy at the time of the Cappadocian Fathers, namely Neoplatonism, had identified the One
with God Himself, considering the multiplicity of beings, the many
, to be emanations basically of a degrading nature, so that the return to the One
through the recollection of the soul was thought to be the purpose and aim of all existence. Earlier on in the first century, Philo, whose significance as the link between classical Platonism and Neoplatonism was decisive, had argued that God is the only true One
because He is the only one who is truly alone
. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity as developed by the Cappadocians ran counter to this priority and exaltation of the One
over the Many
in philosophy.
With regard to human existence, too, classical Greek philosophy at that time had given priority to nature over particular persons. The views current at the time of the Cappadocian Fathers were either of a Platonic or of an Aristotelian kind. The first spoke of human nature as an ideal humanity, a genos hyperkeimenon, whose image every human being is, whereas the latter preferred to give priority to a substratum of the human species, a genos hypokeimenon, from which the various human beings emerge. See Basil, Ep. 361 and 362. For a discussion of these letters and their philosophical significance see my On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood
in Chr. Schwöbel and C. E. Gunton (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine, Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1991, pp. 37ff. In both cases, man in his diversity and plurality of persons was subject to the necessity — or priority — of his nature. Nature or substance always preceded the person in classical Greek thought.
The Cappadocian Fathers challenged this established view of philosophy through their Trinitarian theology. They claimed that the priority of nature over the person, or of the one
over the many
, is due to the fact that human existence is a created existence, i.e. it is an existence with a beginning, and should not be made into a metaphysical principle. True being in its genuine metaphysical state, which concerns philosophy par excellence, is to be found in God, whose uncreated existence does not involve the priority of the One
or of nature over the Many
or the persons. The way in which God exists involves simultaneously the One
and the Many
, and this means that the person has to be given ontological primacy in philosophy.
To give ontological primacy to the person would mean to undo the fundamental principles with which Greek philosophy had operated since its inception. The particular person never had an ontological role in classical Greek thought. What mattered ultimately was the unity or totality of being of which man was but a portion. Plato, in addressing the particular being, makes it clear that the whole was not brought into being for thy sake, but thou art brought for its sake
. With a striking consistency, classical Greek tragedy invited man — and even the gods — to succumb to the order and justice that held the universe together, so that kosmos (meaning both natural order and proper behaviour) may prevail. Underneath the variety of beings, the many
, there is the one Reason (Logos) that gives them their significance in existence. No digression from this one Reason can be allowed for the many
or for the particular beings without a disruption of being, even the very being of these particular beings.
The Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocian Fathers involved a philosophy in which the particular was not secondary to being or nature; it was thus free in an absolute sense. In classical thought, freedom was cherished as a quality of the individual, but not in an ontological sense. The person was free to express his views but was obliged to succumb finally to the common Reason, the xunos logos of Heraclitus. Furthermore, the possibility that the person might pose the question of his freedom from his very existence was entirely inconceivable in ancient philosophy. It was, in fact, first raised in modern times by Dostoevsky and other modern existentialist philosophers. Freedom in antiquity always had a restricted moral sense, and did not involve the question of the being of the world, which was a given
and an external reality for the Greeks. On the contrary, for the Fathers the world’s being was due to the freedom of a person, God. Freedom is the cause
of being for Patristic thought. For further discussion see my Being as Communion, London: Darton, Longman & Todd 1985, esp. ch. 1.
Cappadocian theology stressed this principle of freedom as a presupposition of being by extending it to cover the being of God Himself. This was a great innovation of the Cappadocian Fathers, even with regard to their Christian predecessors. The Cappadocian Fathers for the first time in history introduced into the being of God the concept of cause (aition), in order to attach it significantly not to the one
(God’s nature) — but to a person, the Father. By distinguishing carefully and persistently between the nature of God and God as the Father, they thought that what causes God to be is the Person of the Father, not the one divine substance. By so doing, they gave to the person ontological priority, and thus freed existence from the logical necessity of substance, of the self-existent
. This was a revolutionary step in philosophy, the anthropological consequences of which must not pass unnoticed.
III. The Anthropological Consequences
Man, for the Fathers, is the image of God
. He is not God by nature, since he is created, i.e. he has had a beginning, and thus is subject to the limitations of space and time which involve individuation and ultimately death. Nevertheless, he is called to exist in the way God exists.
In order to understand this, we must consider the distinction made by the Cappadocian Fathers between nature and person or mode of existence
(tropos hyparxeos), as they called it. Nature or substance points to the simple fact that something exists, to the what (ti) of something. It can be predicated of more than one thing. Person or hypostasis, on the other hand, points to how (hopos or pos) and can only be predicated of one being, and this in an absolute sense. When we consider human nature (or substance: ousia), we refer it to all human beings; there is nothing unique about having a human nature. Furthermore, all the natural
characteristics of human nature such as dividedness — and hence individuation leading to decomposition and finally death — are all aspects of human substance
and determine the human being as far as its nature is concerned. It is the how of human nature, i.e. personhood, that by acquiring the role of ontological cause, as is the case with God’s being, determines whether nature’s limitations will finally be overcome or not. The image of God
in man has precisely to do with this how, not with the what man is; it relates not to nature — man can never become God by nature — but to personhood. This means that man is free to affect the how of his existence either in the direction of the way (the how) God is, or in the direction of what his, i.e. man’s nature is. Living according to nature (kata physin), would thus amount to individualism, mortality, etc., since man is not immortal kata physin. Living, on the other hand, according to the image of God means living in the way God exists, i.e. as an image of God’s personhood, and this would amount to becoming God
. This is what the theosis of man means in the thinking of the Greek Fathers.
It follows from this that although man’s nature is ontologically prior to his personhood, as we have already noted, man is called to an effort to free himself from the necessity of his nature and behave in all respects as if the person were free from the laws of nature. In practical terms, this is what the Fathers saw in the ascetic effort which they regarded as essential to all human existence, regardless of whether one was a monk or lived in the world. Without an attempt to free the person from the necessity of nature, one cannot be the image of God
, since in God, as we have noted above, the person, and not nature, causes Him to be the way He is.
The essence, therefore, of the anthropology which results from the Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocian Fathers lies in the significance of personhood in human existence. The Cappadocian Fathers gave to the world the most precious concept it possesses: the concept of the person, as an ontological concept in the ultimate sense. Since this concept has become, at least in principle, not only part of our Christian heritage but also an ideal of our culture in general, it may be useful to remind ourselves of its exact content and significance as it emerges from a study of the theology of the Cappadocians.
(a) As it emerges from the way personhood is understood by the Cappadocian Fathers with reference to God, the person is not a secondary but a primary and absolute notion in existence. Nothing is more sacred than the person since it constitutes the way of being
of God Himself. The person cannot be sacrificed or subjected to any ideal, to any moral or natural order, or to any expediency or objective, even of the most sacred kind. In order to be truly and be yourself, you must be a person, i.e. you must be free from and higher than any necessity or objective — natural, moral, religious, or ideological. What gives meaning and value to existence is the person as absolute freedom.
(b) The person cannot exist in isolation. God is not alone; He is communion. Love is not a feeling, a sentiment springing from nature like a flower from a tree. Love is a relationship, it is the free coming out of one’s self, the breaking of one’s will, a free submission to the will of another. It is the other and our relationship with him that gives us our identity, our otherness, making us who we are
, i.e. persons; for by being an inseparable part of a relationship that matters ontologically we emerge as unique and irreplaceable entities. This, therefore, is what accounts for our being, and our being ourselves and not someone else: our personhood. It is in this that the reason
, the logos of our being lies: in the relationship of love that makes us unique and irreplaceable for another. The logos that accounts for God’s being is the uniquely beloved Son, and it is through this loving relationship that God, too, or rather God par excellence, emerges as unique and irreplaceable by being eternally the Father of a unique (monogenes) Son. This is the great message of the Patristic idea of the person. The raison d’être, the logos tou einai of each one’s being, for which the Greek mind was always searching, is not to be found in the nature of this being, but in the person, i.e. in the identity created freely by love and not by the necessity of its self-existence. As a person you exist as long as you love and are loved. When you are treated as nature, as a thing, you die as a particular identity. And if your soul is immortal, what is the use? You will exist, but without a personal identity; you will be eternally dying in the hell of anonymity, in the Hades of immortal souls. For nature in itself cannot give you existence and being as an absolutely unique and particular identity. Nature always points to the general; it is the person that safeguards uniqueness and absolute particularity. The immortality, therefore, of one’s soul, even if it implies existence, cannot imply personal identity in the true sense. Now that we know, thanks to the Patristic theology of personhood, how God exists, we know what it means truly to exist as a particular being. As images of God we are persons, not natures: there can never be an image of the nature of God, nor would it be a welcome thing for humanity to be absorbed in divine nature. Only when in this life we exist as persons can we hope to live eternally in the true, personal sense. This means that exactly as is the case with God, so with us, too: personal identity can emerge only from love as freedom and from freedom as love.
(c) The person is something unique and unrepeatable. Nature and species are perpetuated and replaceable. Individuals taken as nature or species are never absolutely unique. They can be similar; they can be composed and decomposed; they can be combined with others in order to produce results or even new species; they can be used to serve purposes — sacred or not, this does not matter. On the contrary, persons can neither be reproduced nor perpetuated like species; they cannot be composed or decomposed, combined or used for any objective whatsoever — even the most sacred one. Whosoever treats a person in such ways automatically turns him into a thing, he dissolves and brings into non-existence his personal particularity. If one does not see one’s fellow human being as the image of God in this sense, i.e. as a person, then one cannot see this being as a truly eternal identity. For death dissolves us all into one indistinguishable nature, turning us into substance
, or things. What gives us an identity that does not die is not our nature but our personal relationship with God’s undying personal identity. Only when nature is hypostatic or personal, as is the case with God, does it exist truly and eternally. For it is only then that it acquires uniqueness and becomes an unrepeatable and irreplaceable particularity in the mode of being
which we find in the Trinity.
Conclusion
If we are allowed or even incited in our culture to think or hope for true personhood in human existence, we owe it above all to the Christian thought that Cappadocia produced in the fourth century. The Cappadocian Church Fathers developed and bequeathed to us a concept of God, who exists as a communion of free love out of which unique, irreplaceable, and unrepeatable identities emerge, i.e. true persons in the absolute ontological sense. It is of such a God that man is meant to be an image
. There is no higher and fuller anthropology than this anthropology of true and full personhood.
Modern man tends on the whole to think highly of an anthropology of personhood, but the common and widespread assumptions as to what a person is are by no means consonant with what we have seen emerging from a study of the Cappadocian Fathers. Most of us today, when we say person
mean an individual. This goes back to Augustine, and especially Boethius in the fifth century ad, who defined the person as an individual nature endowed with rationality and consciousness. Throughout the entire history of Western thought the equation of person with the thinking, self-conscious individual has led to a culture in which the thinking individual has become the highest concept in anthropology. This is not what emerges from the thought of the Cappadocian Fathers. It is rather the opposite of this that results from a study of their thought. For, according to it, true personhood arises not from one’s individualistic isolation from others, but from love and relationship with others, from communion. Love alone, free love, unqualified by natural necessities, can generate personhood. This is true of God whose being, as the Cappadocian Fathers saw it, is constituted and hypostasized
through a free event of love caused by a free and loving person, the Father, and not by the necessity of divine nature. This is true also of man who is called to exercise his freedom as love and his love as freedom, and thus show himself to be the image of God
.
In our times, several attempts are being made by Western philosophers to correct the Western equation of the person
with the individual
. Thus, J. Macmurray, The Self as Agent, London: Faber & Faber 1957, and Persons in Relation, London: Faber & Faber 1961. Christianity’s encounter with other religions, such as Buddhism, is forcing people to reconsider this traditional individualistic view of personhood. Today, then, is perhaps the most appropriate time to go back to a deeper study and appreciation of the fruits of Christian thought produced in Cappadocia in the fourth century, the most important of which is undoubtedly the idea of the person, as the Cappadocian Fathers saw and developed it.
This, therefore, is the existential — in the broader sense — significance of the Cappadocian contribution to Trinitarian theology: it makes us see in God a kind of existence we all want to lead; it is, therefore, basically a soteriological theology. But I think the Cappadocians have also something to say to some of today’s issues concerning the doctrine of God. I refer particularly to the issues raised by feminist theology, especially concerning the use of names for God. The Cappadocians, in accordance with the apophatic tradition of the East, would say that all language concerning the substance of God and its qualities or energies is bound to be inadequate. Yet, a distinction must be made between nature and person also at the level of human discourse. The names Father, Son, and Spirit are indicative of personal identity. And since these are the only names that indicate personal identity they cannot be changed. Names indicating energies are changeable (e.g. God is good, or powerful, for example), because they are all drawn from our experience, which cannot adequately describe God. But what about Father, Son, and Spirit — are they drawn from experience? Is there any analogy possible between God’s Fatherhood and human fatherhood? There may be something of an analogy in what concerns moral qualities attached to Fatherhood (Creator, loving and caring person, etc.). But these are not personal properties — they apply to all three persons of the Trinity, i.e. to the common substance or energy. Father, Son, and Spirit are names of personal identity, names by which God in Christ reveals Himself and names Himself for us. This is the big difference between Trinitarian language and even the appellation God
, which, in the sense of divinitas, is not a name of God. Only as Person is He nameable. But His name is known and revealed to us only in Christ, which means only in and through the Father-Son relationship. He is, therefore, only known as Father.
The distinction between nature and person is, therefore, crucial also with regard to the issue of what is called comprehensive language
. Equally, it is crucial whether we identify the one God with the Father or with the one substance. For if He is Father only secondarily and not in His ultimate personal identity, Fatherhood is not the name of God, but a name about God. In this case, it can be changed so as to convey better the message we wish to convey about God’s being.
The Cappadocians have taught us that the Trinity is not a matter for academic speculation, but for personal relationship. As such, it is truth revealed only by participation in the Father-Son relationship through the Spirit which allows us to cry Abba, Father
. The Trinity is, therefore, revealed only in the Church, i.e. the community through which we become sons of the Father of Jesus Christ. Outside this it remains a stumbling block and a scandal.
